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AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO PROPORTIONALITY 
BETWEEN MATRICES* 
M. L. BALINSKI AND G. DEMANGE 
Ecole Polvtechnique 
Given a matrix p > 0 what does it mean to say that a matrix f (of the same dimension), 
whose row and column sums must fall between specific limits, is "proportional to" p? This 
paper gives an axiomatic solution to this question in two distinct contexts. First, for any real 
"allocation" matrix f. Second, for any integer constrained "apportionment" matrix f. 
In the case of f real the solution turns out to coincide with what has been variously called 
biproportional scaling and diagonal equivalence and has been much used in econometrics and 
statistics. In the case of f integer the problem arises in the simultaneous apportionment of seats 
to regions and to parties and also in the rounding of tables of census data. 
Introduction. Regional councils in the Netherlands are composed of seats that 
simultaneously represent both townships and political parties [2]. The stated intent is 
that each township should receive a number of seats proportional to its population and 
each party a number of seats proportional to its total vote. The ideal or proportionality 
is as old as the hills and by now commonplace: given a vector of real numbers 
P = (P, .., P,), j > 0, f = (f,.., f,,) summing to h > 0 is proportional to p if 
f = Xp for X > 0, and that is the end of the story. 
But when f is subject to other constraints-for example, cj fj < cf for all 
j-then what should it mean to say that f is "proportional to" p? And when, in 
addition, the fi are to be numbers of seats and so integer, what then? This is the 
(vector) apportionment problem: how to allocate representation in a house of h seats 
among regions or townships (of populations p) or among political parties (having vote 
totals p). A theory of apportionment has been developed that gives a meaning to 
proportionality in this setting [6], and so an approach to determining how many seats 
each township should receive and how many each party should receive in a Dutch 
regional council. But if pij is the number of votes in township i for party j how many 
candidates on the list of party j in township i should be declared elected? The reflex 
response is, proportional numbers: but what precisely does this mean? There are two 
types of constraints. One type demands that the total number allocated to a township 
add up to the number it deserves, and to a party the number it deserves; the other type 
asks that these allocations be integer values. Our aim is to arrive at axiomatic 
definitions of proportionality between matrices when one must satisfy (i) the first 
constraints only (the real case) and (ii) both types of constraints (the integer case). 
The simpler real case is addressed first: given a matrix p > 0 of real numbers what 
should it mean to say that a matrix of real numbers subject to bounds on row and 
column sums is "proportional to" p? Axioms are proposed that yield a unique solution 
(when such exist) which turns out to have been the subject of prior work much used in 
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a wide variety of contexts. Referred to as diagonal equivalence [10], [18] and bipropor- 
tional scaling [4] it has been used in statistics and econometrics for adjusting contin- 
gency tables [14], balancing social accounting matrices [17] and estimating traffic flows 
(see [16]) or international trade accounts [15], and in allocating marketing budgets. A 
comprehensive overview of approaches and uses was collected in one volume in 
1976 [1]. 
The unique solution minimizes an entropy function, a fact frequently noted, but no 
other justification has previously been forthcoming. It is also easily computed by 
alternately scaling rows and columns (the "RAS" method), as many people have 
discovered independently. However, the prior work has treated the real case with 
equation constraints (as indicated above) whereas we treat the more general case of 
inequality constraints, where the result obtained gives additional credence to the claim 
that the sense of proportionality has been properly extended. 
The integer case is addressed next: the identical question is posed except that now 
the matrix f is further constrained to be integer valued. The set of axioms used are in 
spirit identical to those used in the real case, but in the integer case uniqueness cannot 
be realized. Indeed, without further restrictions (that should be chosen as a function of 
the application at hand), our axioms determine an infinite class of "divisor methods", 
any one of which can yield more than one solution. However, the set of solutions of 
any one method are unique "up to ties", and solutions of different methods bear close 
relationships to each other. 
Part I describes the axiomatic approach to proportionality between matrices in reals, 
and characterizes when solutions exist. Part II treats the integer case. 
I. Proportionality in reals. 
I.1. Definitions and axioms. A problem is a pair (p, a), where p = (Pij) > 0 is a 
matrix containing no row or column of zeros, i E M = (1,2,..., m) and j E N = 
(1, 2,..., n}, and a = (r-, r+, c-, c+, h) is a nonnegative vector with r- = (ri ) and 
r+= (ri+), i M, c-= (cJ) and c+= (c j), j E N, and h a positive scalar. The region 
of allocations R(a) is 
R(a) = {f = (f/y) > 0: ri < fiN < ri+, i E M, c fM < C 
, 
j E N, fMN = h} 
where t = (Etij: i E Ic M and j E J c N}. 
From now on, we consider only nonempty regions of allocations: ri- ri+ for all i in 
M, rf < h < rM and similarly for columns. 
The central question of the first part of the paper is: what does it mean to say that 
an allocation f E R(a) is proportional to p and when do such allocations exist? 
It will be necessary to distinguish several special cases of problems (p, a). If p > 0 
the problem is positive. If r-= r+ and c-= c the problem is equality constrained, and 
we write r = r-= r+ and c = c-= c+. If r-= 0, c-= 0, and ri+> h, i E M, and 
cj+ h, j E N, the problem is free so we may drop the superfluous parameters 
and write the problem (p, h). If either m = 1 or n = 1, it is a vector problem. 
Throughout I denotes the complement of I in M, and J the complement of J in N. A 
problem is said to be weakly irreducible if r+> 0 for all i and cf > 0 for all j, and 
r, < h and cj < h for every proper subset I c M and J c N. Weak irreducibility 
simply excludes obvious instances where f e R(o) implies f has some row or column 
of zeros. 
A method of allocation F is a rule or mapping that assigns at least one allocation to 
every problem: F(p, o) is a nonempty subset of R(a). The possibility of multiple 
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allocations is not excluded. The ideal of proportionality suggests that F should satisfy 
a number of elementary properties. These are specified in the following list of axioms. 
They are justified below. 
AXIOM 1 (Exactness). If (p, o) is free then f = (h/pMN)p = F(p, o). 
AXIOM 2 (Relevance). If F(p, o) n R(6) # 0 and R(a) c R(a) then F(p, 6) c 
F(p, a) n R(a). 
Let tzxJ be the submatrix of t defined on rows I c M and columns J c N. Given 
f E F(p, a) the subproblem (Plxj, alxj) has the region R(alxj) defined over rows I 
and columns J with lower bounds ri-- fi and c- - fi, upper bounds ri+- fj and 
c+- fii, and sum f. 
AXIOM 3 (Uniformity). If tf E F(p, o) then f,xj E F(plxj, axj); and, conversely, 
if glxj is another F-allocation of the subproblem then g defined to be equal to glxj on 
I x J and f elsewhere is also an F-allocation: g E F(p, o). 
AXIOM 4 (Monotonicity). If f E F(p, a), f' E F(p', a), and p' is equal to p except 
that Pkl < Pkl then fkl < fk'. 
AXIOM 5 (Homogeneity). Suppose (p, o) is equality constrained. If two rows of p 
are proportional, p,i= XPk., and are constrained to the same sum, ri = rk, then the 
corresponding rows of any f E F(p, o) are identical: f i= f k (and the same holds for 
columns). 
Exactness asks that if the usual notion of proportionality works it is the unique 
solution. Axiom 2 is a kind of "independence of irrelevant alternatives" property and 
says that if the extra room of R(a) lands one in the smaller R(a) then surely one can 
do no better in R(6) itself. Uniformity is the familiar property that any part of a 
proportional solution must itself be proportional. It is a key idea in many fair division 
problems, and often called "consistency" ([7], [3], [21]). Homogeneity simply requires 
answers consistent with what one would expect for vector proportionality. 
1.2. The fair share matrix. It will be convenient to use the notations py = (pijYj) 
and xpy = (xipijyj) where x = (xi) and y = (Yi). 
A matrix f is said to be a fair share matrix for a problem (p, o) if 
(1) f=SXp,p, f R(a) 
for some 8 > 0, X > 0, ,u > 0 satisfying 
Xi > 1 implies fN = r.- and Xi < 1 implies fiN = r+, 
/j > 1 implies fMi = cj and j < 1 implies fMj = cj. 
Intuitively one can see that a fair share matrix departs from the usual proportional 
matrix only via multipliers of rows and columns, a multiplier being greater than one 
(or less than one) only if it must be to meet the lower bound (or to meet the upper 
bound) requirement. 
An alternative description is sometimes useful. A matrix f satisfies conditions (2) for 
a problem (p, a) if 
(2) f=xpy, f R(a) 
for some x > 0, y > 0 satisfying 
xi > xk implies fN = ri or fkN = r, 
y > y, implies fMj = c- or fMl = cj~. 
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LEMMA 1. If f is a fair share matrix then it satisfies conditions (2). Conversely, if 
conditions (2) hold and (p, o) is weakly irreducible, then f is a fair share matrix. 
PROOF. If f is a fair share matrix it clearly satisfies (2). Conversely, if (2) holds 
there is an a > 0 such that xi < a < xk for every i and k satisfying fN > ri- and 
fkN < rk. Indeed, if fkN = rk- for every k E M take a = max xi > 0. If for some k, 
fkN < rk then take a = min{xk: fkN < rk }. It is strictly positive since otherwise, 
xk = and = fkN < rk for some k, so that by (2), for all xi > 0, iN = ri- must 
hold. This implies that h = rM_k, contradicting weak irreducibility. Choose similarly a 
/ > 0 for the columns. Now take Xi = xi/a and /j = yj/fl. * 
LEMMA 2. Let (p, o) and (p', o) be two problems, and f and f' associated fair share 
matrices. If P < p, for some (k, 1) and pij = pi' for (i, j) = (k, 1) then fkl < fk/. 
PROOF. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose fkl > fk' and let x, y and x', y' 
be the respective multipliers. 
If fii > fi then xiyi > xyj'. This follows from pij < p' and xipijyi > x'p,'yj. 
If fii < f4j then xiyi < xy!'. Indeed, (i, j) = (k, 1) so pij = p[', implying pij = 0. 
Suppose first that there is a "loop" of entries of f - f', (i1, ji),(i2, Ij), 
(i2, j2),...,(it, jt),(i1, j,), where entries corresponding to (i,, Js) are positive and 
entries corresponding to (is+1, js) are negative (including i,+1 = i). So 
Xi,Yj >XYs and Xs+lyj > Xislyj, s = 1,..., t, 
and multiplying all these 2t inequalities yields 1 > 1: a contradiction. 
Given f - f' # 0 and the fact that loops of alternating signs are forbidden there is 
some row or column where the respective sums over f and f' are different, say 
fiN > fN-. We will show below that then there exists some j E N such that fMi > f,i 
and x1yi > xyj'. But fiN > f/N implies there is some other row, say row 2, with 
f2N < f2'. An identical argument shows that there exists some g E N with fMg < fjg 
and x2yg < x;yg, and thus xlx2yjyg < xlxyijyg. This gives the sought for contradic- 
tion: fiN > f{N and f2N < f2N implies x1 < x2 and x > x2, whereas fMj > f; and 
fMg < f/g implies yj < yg and yj' > yg so xlx2yjyg > xxxyjyjg. 
It remains to show that given fiN > f'N, there is a j in N such that fMj > f/j and 
x1yi > x'yj'. Label row 1 and continue to label as follows: 
-if row i is labelled, and a column j with fi - fif > 0 is not, then label j with 
{i}, 
-if column j is labelled, and a row i with fi - fi < 0 is not, then label i with 
{J}, 
until either (a) some row i is labelled with fiN < fi or (b) no further labelling is 
possible. 
If (a) occurs i = ix labelled with { j ), j, labelled with { i2 ,..., on to row 1 singles 
out a path of alternating signs with xi,yj < x'y' for the negative signs, and x,iy > 
x, Y!j for the positive ones. Multiplying as before yields the result xixf < x'x1. But 
r>- flN > fl'N > r and ri fiN > fN > r,- so xi > x1 and x1 > x' implying xix[ > 
xlxl, a contradiction. 
This leaves (b) as the only possibility. Let I be the set of labelled rows (I the 
complement), J the set of labelled columns (J the complement). (Refer to Diagram 1 
for the sequel.) By the labelling rules fij > fi for (i, j) E I x J and fij < fi/ for 
(i, j) E I x J. Moreover, since (a) did not occur, f,N > fiN for i E I, and since 
fIN > f1i, f,N > f/N and therefore f,j - f/ = (f, - flN) - (fl, - fl/) > 0. This in 
turn implies fMJ > f/j and, therefore, for some j E J, fMj > f/j. 
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J J 
> f, f,> ; ^ > ff,N so f\. > f/\v 
f J f,>f 
so fvJ > fSM 
DIAGRAM 1. Case (b) after labelling. 
Since j E J, there is a path of alternating signs from column j to row 1 beginning 
and ending with positive signs. Multiplying as before yields x1y, > xyi', as was to be 
shown. The argument for the case f2N < f2N is the same except that the signs are 
reversed. ? 
THEOREM 1. If (p, a) is positive and weakly irreducible, a fair share matrix exists 
and is unique. 
PROOF. If a fair share matrix exists, uniqueness is immediate by Lemma 2. 
Existence is established via a fixed point argument. 
To construct the mapping observe, first, that the result holds for any vector problem 
(m = 1), (p, c-, c+, h). To see this, by weak irreducibility there is a 6 > 0 such that 
Ei mid(cj-, 68p, c) = h, where mid(x, y, z) is the middle in value of the three num- 
bers x, y, z. The vector f = (fj) where fj = mid(cl, Sp., cj1) is the fair share vector: if 
c 6< Spj < c+ take p = 1; if 8pj < cj take ij cJ-/pj > 1; and if c+< 86p take 
ti = cJ+/6p < 1. 
Define (p(p, c-,c+, h) to be the function with value equal to the unique fair share 
vector f. The mapping qp is continuous in p. For consider a sequence p' converging to p 
and the corresponding sequence of fair shares f 5. Since the f S all belong to the compact 
set {f > 0: fI = h , a subsequence converges to some f ; moreover the 68 such that 
fS = mid(cj, 6pj, Cj) may be chosen from the bounded set min c- /pj < 8s 
max1 cJ/pj. Letting 8 be an accumulation point of the 68, fj = mid(cJ, 8p/, c7), so f 
is the fair share of p and the continuity of (p is proven. 
Now, let (p, o) be a matrix problem and S = {x = (x,) > 0: xM = 1}. Construct 
the mapping ( = t o v with 
v(x) = y where yj = i(c ,-,c+, h)/rc and j = xx,pij, and 
t(y) = z/zL, where zi = %1(i,r-,r+, h)/,i and i = Epijy- 
i J 
One can think of (p as a process of repeated adjustment: given a set of row multipliers 
x, obtain a row vector problem and define y to be the column multipliers for the 
corresponding fair share row vector; then given y obtain a column vector problem and 
define a new normalized set of row multipliers x (namely, z/Ei,z). From this perspec- 
tive (I generalizes the standard algorithmic approach-the RAS method-to finding 
the fair share matrix in the equality constrained case. 
The positivity of p implies al > 0, and Eji7jYj = h together with y > 0 implies t > 0. 
Thus D is well defined and, by the continuity of p, is continuous on the simplex S, and 
so by Brouwer's theorem must have a fixed point x*. Define y* = v(x*): then f* with 
fi = x*pijyj* is a fair share matrix of (p, a). To see this, using l*, t* and z* to 
designate the associated values, note, first, that fMN = Ej,(E1*pii)Yi* = EjT*Y* = h. 
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Second, observe that z* = x*: by definition of ? and of x*, x* = =(x*) = az* for 
some a > 0 so fMN = i,x*(EijPijy*) = a(Eizi**) = ah, thus a = 1. Finally, since 
y* is a set of multipliers for a vector problem it is already known that yj* > y,* implies 
yj*'jq = cj or yl* f = Cix *pijy = cy or fMI = cj. The analogous 
conditions for x are verified similarly, and this completes the proof. * 
We may now refer unequivocally to "the fair share method" F*. It should be 
remarked that a fair share matrix minimizes the entropy function over the feasible set 
R(a). The existence and uniqueness of solutions may be obtained by standard convex 
optimization techniques. This is well known for the equality constrained problem (see, 
e.g., [4]). The RAS method may be generalized to the inequality problem and 
interpreted as a cyclic coordinate ascent method for maximizing the dual program [5] 
(see also [11] for interval convex programs). 
1.3. Characterization. 
THEOREM 2. The fair share method F* is the unique method of allocation satisfying 
Axioms 1 through 5 over the class of positive, weakly irreducible problems. 
PROOF. Sufficiency. We begin by checking that F* satisfies the axioms. Exactness is 
immediate. F* is relevant because suppose (the unique) f = F*(p, o) E R(6) and 
R(6) c R(a). By Lemma 1 f = (f;j) may be defined by conditions (2). If xi > xk then 
either fkN = rk or fi = r-. We then claim that either fkN= = or fiN = r-. For 
suppose not: then fkN < ?k and fiN > ^ . Choose a column I such that fi, > 0 and 
define f to be equal to f except for indices (k, 1) and (i, 1) where fk = fk, + i and 
fi =f, - c. For E > 0 and small, f E R(a) but f ( R a), an contradiction. The 
remaining conditions (2) showing that f is the fair share matrix for the problem (p, 6) 
are verified similarly. Uniformity and homogeneity are immediate, and monotonicity is 
a consequence of Lemma 2. 
Necessity is established in three stages beginning with vector problems, then going 
on to matrix equality constrained problems and finally to the general problem. F is 
any method of allocation satisfying the Axioms 1 through 5. 
Vector problems. Let (p, c-, c+, h) be a vector problem and f = (Spj1ji) be its fair 
share. By exactness f = F((pjAi),c-,c+, h). Suppose /u1 = 1, say /1 < 1 and let f' e F((p1, P22,*..., Pnpn), C-, e+, h). By monotonicity f' > fi, but M1 < 1 implies 
fi = c1 so that f' = =f cC1. Therefore, by uniformity, (f2,..., f,) and (f2,..., fn) 
are both allocations of F((p2,2,..., Pnl,n), (C2,., Cn ),2..., c), h - c1). But 
again by exactness (f2,..., fn) = (8p2.., 8p,) is the unique F-allocation so 
fj = fi' for j = 2,..., m and f E F(pl, P2M22, --.-, P,,,, c- , h). Repeating the same 
argument at most n times shows f = F(p, c-, c+, h). 
Matrix equality constrained problems. Given an m x n matrix problem (p, o), where 
row sums are constrained to sum to r and column sums to c, consider the m X 2n 
problem ((p,py),2r,(c,c),2h) for some y > 0. By the homogeneity of F an F-allo- 
cation must have the form (f, f); by uniformity f E F(p, r, c, h) and, moreover, if g were 
another F-allocation of the original problem, then (f, g) would have to be an F-alloc- 
ation of the replicated problem. g + f contradicts homogeneity so F assigns a unique 
allocation to any equality constrained problem. Furthermore, f belongs also to 
F(py, r, c, h) and so is its unique allocation. By the same argument on columns one 
concludes that F(xpy, a) = F(p, o) for any equality constrained problem and any 
x > 0, y > 0. Choose then the multipliers x* and y* that give the fair shares f* of 
(p, a): by exactness f* = F(x*py*, a), so the fair share matrix is the unique allocation 
of F(p, a). 
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The general case. Suppose f* E F(p, o), and let R(a*) = {f > 0: fiN = fi, fMj = f/ 
and MN = h}. Since F is relevant, f* E F(p, a*), and by the results of the previous 
paragraph, f* = xpy for some x > 0 and y > 0. To see that the conditions (2) are 
verified suppose that fmj > cJ and fm, < c and let i be any row. Then, by 
uniformity, (f, , fi.) is an F-solution to the 2-vector problem with vector (pi, pit) and 
region R' = {(fi, fi,): Ck- fk + fi * /< cik - f/k + ik for k = , 1, and fi, + 
fil = f/i + f4 }, and, since a vector, we already know it must be the fair share for this 
vector problem. But f, < c - f, + -f , and f,* > c - f + f,, so / fi / Pl 
implying yj < y,. The same argument applies for x. Therefore, x and y satisfy the 
conditions (2) and f* is the fair share matrix of (p, o), completing the proof. * 
1.4. Extending fair shares to matrices with zeros. When p > 0 is not strictly 
positive, a fair share matrix does not necessarily exist even when p contains no row or 
column of zeros and is weakly irreducible, a fact known and analyzed in the equality 
constrained problem [4], [19]. The object of this section is to give conditions under 
which the definition of a fair share can be extended in a unique way by continuity. As 
a by-product the continuity of the fair shares over the set of positive weakly irreducible 
problems is proven. Consider first two examples. Both are equality constrained 
problems. 
EXAMPLE 1. 
P= [ 1] r=(1,1), c= (1,1). 
All the allocations in R(a) are as follows; 
f(a) = 1a a with0 < a < 1 
a/ ] 
- 
- a 
Since a fair share has exactly the same zeros as p, none can exist here. However one 
can define an extended fair share without ambiguity. Indeed take a sequence pS 
converging to p. The fair share of (p", as) is the matrix f(as) where as is the unique 
positive solution to 
(1-a)2 a2 
PllP22 P12P21 
Since PllP22 tends to 1 and P12P21 tends to zero, a5 converges to zero and [ ] may 
be qualified as "a fair share". 
This is not always possible as the second example shows. 
EXAMPLE 2. 
1 1 0 
p= 1 1 , r=(2,2,2), c=(1,1,4) and h=6. 
-1 1 1 
If we consider the sequence: 
1 1 1/s 
p = 1 1 1/s, 
1 1 1 
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the corresponding fair shares tend to 
1/2 1/2 1 
1/2 1/2 1 
0 0 2 
whereas for the sequence 
1 1 1/s 
1 1 1/s2 
1 1 1 
they tend to 
0 0 2 
1 1 0. 
0 0 2 
A matrix f is an extended fair share for the problem (p, o) if there exists some 
sequence of problems (p1, S), p > 0 converging to (p, a) such that the sequence 
F*(p', 0S) converges to f. 
Any problem with a nonempty feasible region admits an extended fair share: there 
always exists a sequence of positive weakly irreducible converging to it Oust relax the 
constraints defined by a) and the corresponding fair shares are in a compact set. So the 
interesting question is the uniqueness of this extension. It turns out to be closely 
related to the nonemptiness of the following subset of R(a): 
R?(p, a) = {f E R(a): fij = 0if Pi = 0}. 
In the first example this set is nonempty whereas it is empty in the second one. 
THEOREM 3. If the set R?(p, a) is nonempty, then the extended fair share of the 
problem (p, o) is unique. Moreover it belongs to R?(p, o). 
COROLLARY. The function F* is continuous over the set of positive weakly irreducible 
problems. 
Before proving the theorem we need to investigate the structure of the set R?(p, o). 
The structure of R?(p, a). First we characterize the problems with nonempty R?(p, a). 
LEMMA 3. The set R?(p, a) is nonempty if and only if 
(3) 
c > r1 , rY > cJ and c + r- < h < c + r- for any I c M, J c N with 
PfJ = 0 ( r = 0, etc.). 
PROOF. Consider the bipartite network with nodes M, N, where arc (i, j) exists if 
and only if pij > 0. Add a source s and arcs (s, i) with lower and upper capacities 
equal respectively to r- and ri+. Similarly, add a sink t and arcs (j, t) with lower and 
upper capacities respectively equal to c- and c+. Finally, add arc (t, s) with lower and 
upper capacity equal to h. A feasible circulation exists in this network if and only if 
R?(p, a) is nonempty. But conditions (3) of Lemma 3 are exactly the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions for such a circulation to exist (see Hoffman's theorem in [13, 
p. 51]). ? 
Suppose now that the conditions (3) are met but one of the inequalities involving 
proper subsets I and J is satisfied as an equation. Any matrix f in R?(p, o) can be 
obtained by solving two independent subproblems. Indeed if for example r,-= CJ with 
pij = 0 any such f satisfies f 0j = 0 by definition of R?(p, a) so that r/ < fIN = fIJ < 
C = rj and thus surely fj = 0. The matrix f is of the following form: 
J J 
I f' 0 
I 0 f" 
Moreover f' is in RO(pxjs, a') where a' agrees with a for the constraints on the sums of 
the rows in I and columns in J and where the total sum h' is equal to cj. Analogously 
f" is in R?(pxj , a") where h" = h - c+. Conversely take any f' in R?(pijx, o") (such 
f' necessarily exist), any f" in RO(pixJ,a"), and form the matrix f equal to f' on I x J, 
to f" on I X J and to zero elsewhere; then f is in R?(p, a). All other cases of a binding 
inequality in (3) may be treated in the same way. This leads to the following 
definitions: 
A problem (p, a) with R?(p, o) : 0 is said to be reducible at (I, J) into indepen- 
dent subproblems on (I, J) and (I, J), respectively, if I and J are proper subsets of 
M and N for which an inequality in (3) is binding. 
A problem is irreducible if it is not reducible. 
The key lemma is the following: 
LEMMA 4. Let f be an extended fair share of a problem (p, o) with R?(p, a) - 0. 
Then either f is the fair share of the problem or (not exclusive) the problem is reducible at 
some (I, J), and f XJ and fixj are extended fair shares of the corresponding two 
subproblems. 
PROOF. If f is an extended fair share there is a sequence (pS, as) converging to 
(p, o) with pS > 0 such that the fair shares f converge to f. Choose the multipliers xs 
so that ,ix] = 1. Since xs is in a simplex, one may assume the xs converge to some x. 
Assume that the sequence yS is bounded. Then if y is one of its accumulation points 
surely f = xpy. Moreover, xi > xk implies xt > x} for infinitely many t, implying 
fiN = ri-t or fkN = rk 
t SO fiN = ri- or fkN = rk, and analogously for the columns. 
Therefore f is the fair share of (p, a): this is the first case of Lemma 4. 
Suppose now that the sequence y5 is not bounded. Let J = { j: yj bounded}, and J 
the complement; let I = {i:x, > 0} and I = {i: xi = 0} the complement. By assump- 
tion J 4 0; also I = 0 since 1xi_= 1; an immediate implication is that Pij = 0 for 
(i, j) E I X J. For if (i, j) E I X J, x' converges to x, > 0 and yj is_unbounded, so 
ft = x'pt yJ converges to a finite value only if ii = 0. Hence, I and J (which are not 
empty) must be proper subsets of M and N else p would contain a column or a row of 
zeros. Thus J 4 0; suppose fM, > cl for some 1 E J; then j E J implies yj < y/ for 
infinitely many t, so fMj = c+. This shows that 
either (a) fMj = cJ for all j E J, 
or (b) fMI = cl for all 1 e J. 
Since I and I are not empty, an argument parallel to the one above shows that 
either (c) fiN = ri- for all i E I, 
or (d) fkN = rk for all k E I. 
Consider the four cases in turn. 
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0 *I 
J J* 0 
Pij = 0 xi > 0 
I f,j = 0 xi = 0 
v bounded yi unbounded 
DIAGRAM 2. The Situation in the Limit. 
If (a) and (c) hold, then C. = fMJ = fIJ < fiN < r,. But since R0(p, o) is nonempty 
and pj = 0, cJ > r- by Lemma 3. Therefore all the above inequalities are equations 
implying r =- cJ and frJ = 0. By a similar argument one shows that if (a) and (d) 
hold then h = cJ + rj, and if (b) and (c) hold then h = cJ + r1, and if (b) and (d) 
hold then cJ= r/. Moreover in all cases fj- = 0. Thus the problem is reducible and 
since frJ = fyj = 0 the submatrices ftxJ and fjjX are extended fair shares of the 
corresponding subproblems. Indeed, by uniformity fX,j is the fair share matrix of the 
problem (PIxj, o/xj) where for example the lower bound on row i is equal to r,s - f,j 
and on column j to cJS - fs. But these two expressions tend respectively to ri- and 
cJ since f,j and f/j tend to zero for i in I and j in J. The same argument applies for 
f xj: this ends the proof. m 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. The proof is by induction on n + m. If n + m = 1, it is 
obvious. Take now an m x n problem. Lemma 4 implies that an extended fair share is 
in R?(p, o). Indeed if it is a fair share it is obvious; if not the problem is reducible at 
(I, J) and frJ = fij = 0, fjxJ and fixj are extended fair shares of the corresponding 
subproblems so they are by the induction hypothesis in the corresponding sets R0 and 
thus f is in R?(p, a). Suppose now that f and g are distinct extended fair shares. At 
least one of them, say f, is not the fair share so that the problem is reducible at some 
(I, J). But since g is in R?(p, a) surely g,t = gij = 0, thus gixj and gixj are extended 
fair shares of the corresponding subproblems. By the induction hypothesis (recall that 
the sets R? of these problems are not empty) glxj = fxj and giJ = fixj so that 
f=g. * 
1.5. Existence of a fair share.. In this section we characterize the problems which 
admit a fair share. This generalizes earlier results for the equality problem (e.g. [4], [9]). 
Obviously a fair share belongs to the set R?(p, o) thus a necessary condition is the 
nonemptiness of this set. It is not sufficient (see the first example in 1.4). However an 
immediate implication of Lemma 4 is that a fair share exists for any irreducible 
problem. So let us investigate the reducible problems. Consider the family of equality 
constrained problems: 
1 1 0 
p(t)= 1 0 , r=(9,6,5), c=(7,8,5). 
.t t 1 
Any matrix in R?(p(t), o) is of the following form: 
7 - a 2 + 0 O 
a 6-a 0 . 
0 0 5 
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The problems are all reducible at ({1, 2}, {1, 2}) forcing f3l and f32 to zero. Since a 
fair share has exactly the same zeros as p, one exists here only for t = 0. This leads to 
the following definition: 
A problem is decomposable at (I, J) if it is reducible at (I, J) and pij = 0. 
If a problem is reducible then each of its subproblems is either irreducible or may 
itself be reduced. In the latter case reduce each reducible subproblem and iterate until 
a set of irreducible independent subproblems is obtained. If each reduction is in fact a 
decomposition then the problem is said to be decomposable into independent irre- 
ducible subproblems. A decomposable problem admits a partition of rows M = I7 U 
12 U .. UIk and N = Jl U J2U .. UJk with Plj = 0 if i 4 j. 
THEOREM 4. The problem (p, o) has a fair share matrix if and only if it is 
decomposable into independent irreducible subproblems. 
PROOF. Sufficiency. Suppose that (p, o) is decomposable into independent irre- 
ducible subproblems. If the problem itself is irreducible the result is in hand by Lemma 
4, so assume inductively the existence of a fair share matrix if the problem is 
decomposable into not more than d independent irreducible subproblems, and con- 
sider a problem with d + 1 such subproblems. Let the subproblem on I x J be one of 
the irreducible subproblems and fIxj be its fair share matrix, and let fixj be the fair 
share matrix of the subproblem on I x J. The multipliers within each subproblem 
satisfy the conditions (2) and the problem is weakly irreducible so it only needs to be 
shown that the conditions (2) hold for multipliers corresponding to different subprob- 
lems. 
If cj= r+ the sum over every row of fixJ equals its lower bound and over every 
column its upper bound. So one can scale the multipliers of rows in I up and the 
multipliers of columns in J down so that each multiplier of a row in I is larger than all 
those of fixJ and each multiplier of a column in J is smaller than all those of fj--: 
conditions (2) are then met. If r-+ = cj, a similar scaling of the multipliers of f,xj does 
the trick. If cJ+ r = h then scaling the row multipliers of fixj up and the column 
multipliers of fixj up assures conditions (2) as well and similarly if h = cj + ri-. 
Necessity. If the fair share matrix f exists for a problem (p, a) then fij = 0 if and 
only if p,i = 0, implying f E R?(p, a), so the inequalities (3) must hold. If they are all 
satisfied strictly then (p, a) is irreducible. Otherwise, equality holds for some (I, J). 
But, then, fiJ = fjj = 0 implying Pjj = pJ- = 0, so that (p, o) is decomposable into 
two independent subproblems. The same argument may be repeated for each subprob- 
lem until all subproblems are irreducible. * 
The following subset is the set of allocations with the same zeros as p: 
R+(p, ) = {f E R(a): fij = 0 if and only if Pij = 0. 
COROLLARY. The problem (p, a) has a fair share matrix if and only if R +(p, a) is 
nonempty. 
Clearly, if a fair share exists, R+(p, a) is nonempty. Conversely if R+(p, a) 4 0 
then R?(p, a) 4 0 and the conditions (3) are satisfied. If they are all satisfied strictly 
then the problem is irreducible and a fair share exists by Theorem 5. Otherwise, the 
problem is reducible at some (I, J). But then, if f e R+(p, a), fij = 0 implying 
pi = 0, so the problem is decomposable into two independent subproblems whose 
corresponding sets R+ are nonempty. By an induction argument these subproblems 
are decomposable into independent irreducible subproblems. Thus the problem itself is 
decomposable and admits a fair share by Theorem 4. * 
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II. Proportionality in integers. 
II.1. Definitions and axioms. As before, a problem is a pair (p, o), but we are now 
interested in apportionments in R(a), that is, allocations all of whose components are 
integer valued. The central question of this part of the paper is: what does it mean to 
say that an apportionment a E R(a) is proportional to p and when do such apportion- 
ments exist? 
It is assumed that, as before, p contains no row or column of zeros, and also that all 
of the components of a are integer valued. The set R?(p, o) (defined (in 1.4) plays a 
central role so the reader is reminded that R?(p, a) # 0 for a integer valued if and 
only if it contains integer valued solutions (by a classical result of network flows [13]). 
A method of apportionment A is a rule or mapping that assigns at least one 
apportionment to every problem: A(p, a) is a nonempty integer valued subset of R(a). 
The possibility of multiple apportionments is once again not excluded. The axioms that 
follow are directly inspired by those used for a method of allocation, and are discussed 
below. 
AXIOM 1' (Exactness). If f = F*(p, a) is integer in all components, then A(p, a) = f. 
AXIOM 2' (Relevance). If A(p, o) n R(6) # 0 and R(6) c R(a) then A(p, 6) = 
A(p, a) n R(). 
AXIOM 3' (Uniformity). If a E A(p, a) then the same statements hold as do in 
Axiom 3 with A replacing F and a replacing f. 
AXIOM 4' (Monotonicity). If a E A(p, o), a' E A(p', a) and p' is equal to p except 
that PkI < pl then ak, < ak,. 
Given a in R(a), define I-= {i E M: aiN = ri- and I+= (i E M: aiN = ri } and 
define J- and J+ similarly. 
AXIOM 5' (Homogeneity). If a E A(p, a) and 8 > 0, a > 0 and P > 0 are such 
that 
ai > 1 implies i e I+, and ai < 1 implies i I-, 
,fj > 1 implies j E J+, and Ij < 1 implies j E J-, 
then a E A (axpP, a). 
AXIOM 6' (Completeness). If p" -> p and a E A(ps, o) for every s, then a E A(p, a). 
An apportionment is simply an allocation with the additional requirement that each 
component be integer valued, so if the (unique) acceptable allocation is in integers then 
it is the unique solution. Axiom 2' is a slightly strengthened form of Axiom 2 which is 
justified identically. Axioms 3' and 4' are direct transcriptions of the real counterparts. 
Homogeneity as defined in Axiom 5' is a property that is true for fair share allocations 
satisfying Axioms 1 through 5: one can therefore not expect anything less to hold for 
apportionments. Completeness is a continuity axiom necessary in the case of appor- 
tionment problems that handles a difficulty that does not arise in the case of allocation 
problems. 
11.2. Divisor methods of apportionments. A divisor function d is a strictly mono- 
tone real function defined over the nonnegative integers satisfying a < d(a) < a + 1, 
and d(a) = a and d(b) = b + 1 for no integers a > 1 and b > 0. A d-rounding of 
x = 0 is 0 and of x > 0 is defined by 
[X] = a if d(a - 1) < x < d(a), 
=a or a + 1 if x = d(a), 
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so a d-rounding is unique unless x = d(a), in which case it is a or a +1. Accordingly 
we will sometimes write a E [x]d. In effect, d(a) E [a, a + 1] is the threshold below 
which x is rounded down, above which it is rounded up and at which x is rounded 
either up or down. The additional caveat on the definition of a divisor function 
excludes the possibility that in one open interval (a, a + 1) with a > 0 integer every x 
is rounded up whereas in another interval every x is rounded down. 
An apportionment matrix a belongs to the divisor method Ad based on d for a 
problem (p, o) if 
(4) a = (aij) = ([8Xipij]j d), a E R(a) 
for some 8 > 0, X > 0, p > 0 satisfying 
Xi > 1 implies aN = ri- and X, < 1 implies aN = r+, 
j > 1 implies aM = c and ij < 1 implies aM j= c+. 
The multipliers (8, X, .u) satisfying (4) will be said to be proper for a in A(p, o). 
The set of divisor method apportionments will take on the role of the fair share 
allocations: the integer requirement introduces some indecision on the meaning of 
"proportionality" that cannot be avoided. 
Divisor methods first arose in the study of the vector apportionment problem [6] and 
have a particularly simple realization in that case. To obtain all divisor method 
apportionments based on d for the vector problem with m = 1: determine 8 > 0 so 
that j mid(c-,[8pi]d, f) = h ad and let = mid(cJ,[ pj]d, cf). Several particular 
methods are used for the apportionment of seats in legislatures to regions or to 
political parties in one or another nation, notably: Adams's d(a) = a; Webster's, 
d(a) = a + 1/2; Jefferson's, d(a) = a + 1; and Hill's, d(a) = ja(a + 1). 
LEMMA 5. Suppose a E Ad(p, a) with proper multipliers (8, X, p,) and a' E Ad(p', o). 
IfPki < Pkl for some (k, 1), Pij = p' for (i, j) = (kl) and akl > ak/ then Pkl = pkl and 
(6, X, pt) is proper for a' in Ad(p, o). 
PROOF. The argument parallels that given for Lemma 2, but with several accommo- 
dations for the fact that d-roundings are not unique. 
A divisor method is said to be unique up to ties if the same multipliers (8, X, p.) are 
proper for all a e Ad(p, o). Lemma 5 shows that divisor methods are unique up to ties 
and that this means aij E [8Xipij,tj]d for any a c Ad(p, o). 
In the case of apportionments it is perfectly acceptable to have aj = 0 when 
p,j > 0. Nevertheless, a divisor method Ad based on a divisor function satisfying 
d(O) = 0 implies that aij > 1 if pij > 0. Accordingly, the subset of R?(p, o) defined by 
Rl(p, o) = {f e R?(p, o): ij, > 0 implies f,i > 1) 
will have to be considered. 
THEOREM 5. Let d be a divisor function. If d(0) > 0, Ad(p, o) is nonempty if and 
only if R?(p, o) is nonempty. If d(0) = 0, Ad(p, o) is nonempty if and only if Rl(p, o) is 
nonempty. When Ad-apportionments exist, they are unique up to ties. 
Existence is proven constructively by an algorithm (given in [5]) that either provides 
an Ad-apportionment or shows that R?(p, o) or Rl(p, o), depending upon the d in 
hand, is empty. The algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps, each step 
consisting in changes in multipliers 8, X, p. done very much in the spirit of the 
out-of-kilter method for network flows [13]. Uniqueness up to ties is an immediate 
consequence of Lemma 5. 
Let ejj = {the number of pij> 0: i E I, j E J}. 
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LEMMA 6. The set Rl(p, o) is nonempty if and only if c > r- + e , rj > cj + e, 
and c- + r,-+ e? j < h < ct + rj-- ej for any I c M, J c N with p,j = 0. 
PROOF. Consider the same network as in Lemma 3 but impose a lower capacity of 
1 on any existing arc (i, j). A feasible flow exists in this network if and only if 
Rl(p,a) : 0. a 
LEMMA 7. If R(o) = R(a') then Ad(p, o) = Ad(p, o'). 
PROOF. Define a by ri = min( aN: a E R(a)}, r+= max{ai: a e R(o)}, and c 
and C+ similarly. Then R(d) = R(a), and the vector a depends only on R(a). 
Now suppose a E Ad(p, o), with proper multipliers (8, X, p). Then Xi > 1 implies 
ai, = ri-= r-, and similarly for the other multipliers, so (8, a, pt) is proper for 
a E Ad(p, ). If b E Ad(p, 6) then, by uniqueness up to ties, (8, X, pt) is proper for b in 
Ad(p, 6), so Xi > 1 implies bin = r-= r-, etc., and thus is proper for b E Ad(p, o). a 
11.3. Characterization. A problem (p, o) is strongly positive if p > 0 and 
R1(p, a) 0. 
THEOREM 6. A method of apportionment satisfies the Axioms 1' through 6' over the 
set of strongly positive problems if and only if it is a divisor method. It satisfies them over 
the set of positive problems if and only if it is a divisor method Ad with d(O) > 0. 
PROOF. Sufficiency. We begin by checking that any divisor method Ad satisfies the 
axioms. 
By Theorem 5, Ad is defined over the set of strongly positive problems for any d, 
and over the positive problems if d(O) > 0. To verify exactness, suppose f = F*(p, o) is 
all integer. Since fij E [fij]d then f E Ad(p, a) and only uniqueness must be proven. 
So, suppose f = a E Ad(p, a). Then, by uniqueness up to ties, there must exist a pair 
(i,j) and (k, 1) with aij =fij - 1, aij E [fij]d and also akl = fkl + 1, akl E [fklld, 
contradicting the definition of a divisor function. 
Before turning to relevancy, remark that if R(6) c R(a) we may assume r-> r-, 
r +> r+ and the same for the c. Indeed, if, for example ri-> i-, the region R(6) does 
not change when ir is replaced by ri- and by Lemma 7 the Ad-apportionments are not 
changed either. 
We can now verify relevancy. Suppose a E Ad(p, a) n R(6) for R(6) c R(a). Let 
(8, X, p) be proper multipliers for a in Ad(p, o). Then Xi > 1 implies aiN = r-, 
whereas a E R(6) and R(8) c R(a) imply r- = r-, so aiN = i. The remaining 
conditions (4) are checked similarly, showing (8, X, p,) is proper for a E Ad(p, 6). To 
prove the reverse inclusion, it must be shown that if a E Ad(p, a) n R(6) then any 
b E Ad(p, a) belongs also to Ad(p, o). We have just seen that if (8, X, ,u) is proper for a 
in Ad(p, a) it is also proper for a E Ad(p, 6). By uniqueness up to ties, (8, X, Ip) is 
proper for b E Ad(p, 6) also, so Xi > 1 implies b^N = ^- and a = = r- thus 
biN = ri, and similarly for the remaining conditions (4), so b E Ad(p, a). 
To see that uniformity holds, note first that the restriction of a in Ad(p, o) is clearly 
a solution of the corresponding subproblem on I x J. Conversely, if bfxJ is another 
apportionment of the subproblem, then uniqueness up to ties shows that if the sum 
over a row or column of the subproblem apportionments differ then the corresponding 
multiplier must be 1, so substitution indeed produces an alternate apportionment for 
the whole. 
Monotonicity follows directly from Lemma 5, and homogeneity is immediate. 
Finally, we verify completeness in the case d(0) > 0 (an analogous proof works for 
the case d(O) = 0). Suppose pS converges to p > 0 with a E Ad(ps, a). All we need to 
show is that proper multipliers Ss, XS, IL for the problems (pS, a) can be chosen in a 
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compact set since then any accumulation point will be proper for a in Ad(p, a). Since 
p > 0 we may assume there is a W > 0 satisfying 1 < pS < W and d(a,i) < W for all 
(i, j). Consider any problem (q, o) having a E Ad(q, a) where 1 < q,i < W, all (i, j). 
If (8, X, ,I) is proper we may assume max Xi > 1 and max /j > 1: otherwise Xi < 1 all 
i, implying aiN = r+ and dividing all Xi by max Xi and multiplying 8 by the same 
quantity gives a proper set of multipliers. 
From 8Xiqijipj < W for all (i, j) and qi, > 1, we deduce 8 < W and 8 is in a 
bounded set. 
Suppose that the following condition held: for some (i, j), AX i 1, 8A,qi,j1 > d(O). 
Then Siji > d(O)/W and for every row k in M the inequality 8XAkqkjLj < d(ak ) < W 
implies Ak < W2/d(O), so the X may be taken in a bounded set. 
If the condition does not hold, define K = {k E M: Ak < 1). If k e K, 8Xkqkji,j < 
d(0) for every j, so akN = 0. Choose a > 1 as large as possible satisfying a8Xkqkj1Ji < 
d(O) for k E K and j E N, and X/a > 1 for k 0 K. 8 may be replaced by a8 and Xk 
by Ak/a for k 4 K. If the condition still does not hold then the set K is larger and the 
construction repeated. At some point the condition must obtain, for otherwise K = M 
and a = 0, contradicting aMN = h > 0. The same argument applies to columns, and 
ends the proof. 
Necessity (The free case). It is first shown that any method of apportionment for a 
free problem (no constraints except aMN = h) satisfying the axioms must be a divisor 
method. This part of the proof is similar to the main characterization result for the 
vector case [6], but is somewhat simpler and uses an altered set of axioms. 
A free problem may simply be referred to as (p, h). Consider a method A that 
satisfies the axioms. Let 
Pa = p > 0: (x, y) E A((p,1), a + 2) for some x > a + 1 and y < 1}. 
By exactness a + 1 E Pa for any integer a > 0, so P, = 0 and d(a) = inf P, is well 
defined. It is shown that A is the divisor method Ad. The key fact is 
(5) p/q > d(a)/d(b), (x, y) E A((p,q), h) implies x a + or y b. 
For suppose (5) is true, that d is a divisor function and that a e Ad(p, h) and 
x E A(p,h). Then [PjS8]d = aij all i, j so 
(6) pi,/d(aij - 1) > pki/d(akl) for any i, j and k, I and ai > 1. 
Suppose that all of these inequalities are satisfied strictly but x - a. Then, for some 
(i, j), a,j > xi, > 0, so uniformity and (5) and (6) imply xi, < ail for any / in N and 
xkj < akj for any k in M; repeating the argument from xi, or xkj yields xk/ < akl for 
any (k, I) and xM < h, a contradiction; therefore for any problem (p, h) where the 
inequalities (6) are strict, the methods A and Ad coincide. Completeness shows they 
coincide on all problems. Notice, however, that if A is defined over all positive 
problems, necessarily d(0) > 0. 
To prove (5) we need to establish a number of facts. Since uniformity holds and the 
problem is free it suffices to consider two-population problems. We first show that: 
(7) If(b, c) E A((p, p), h), thenlb - cl 1. 
To see this consider the two cases, h even and h odd. 
If h = 2a, by exactness (a, a) =A((p,p),2a). If h = 2a + 1 first compare (b, c) E 
A((p, p), 2a + 1) with (a + 1, a) = A(((a + 1)p/a, p), 2a + 1), then with (a, a + 1) 
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= A((ap/(a + 1), p),2a + 1). By monotonicity, a + 1 > b and b > a, b is either a 
or a + 1 and the same for c. 
Next, 
(8) a E A(p, h) implies there exists a' E A(p, h + 1) satisfying a' > a. 
Suppose the contrary, namely, that (a, b) E A((p, q), h), (a', b') E A((p, q), h + 1) 
with a > a'. Consider (c, d, c', d') E A((p, q, p, q), 2h + 1). By (7) it may be assumed 
that c + d = h + 1 and c' + d' = h, so by uniformity (a, b, a', b') is also a solution. 
But, then, b < b' + 1 contradicts (7). 
Suppose (x', y') e A((p', q'), h'), x' > a + 1 and 
(9) y' < b. Then p/q > p'/q' and (x, y) E A((p, q), h) 
implies x > a + 1 or y < b for any h. 
Let (.x, y) E A((p, q), h'). By monotonicity and homogeneity, x- > x' > a + 1 so 
y < b. Consider, then, (x, y) E A((p, q), h). If h > h', x > x- > a + 1 by (8), whereas 
if h < h', y < b for the same reason, proving (9). 
By (9) and the definition of Pa 
(10) p > d(a), (x, y) E A((p,1), h) implies either x > a + 1 ory < 1, and 
(11) q < d(b), (x, y) E A((q, 1), h) implies either x < b or y > 2. 
Now, to prove (5), suppose p/q > d(a)/d(b), choose (p', q') so that p/q > p'/q' 
and p' > d(a), q' < d(b), and let (x', y', z') E A((p', q', 1), a + b + 2). We claim 
x' > a + 1 andy' < b. There are two cases to consider. 
Case 1: z' < 1. By uniformity, (y', z') E A((q', 1), y' + z') and (11) implies y' < b, 
so y' + z' < b + 1 and thus x' > a + 1. 
Case 2: z' > 2. By uniformity (x', y') E A((p', 1), x' + y') and (10) implies x' > 
a + 1, so x' + z' > a + 3 and thus y' < b. Now x, y and p/q > p'/q' satisfy the 
hypotheses of (9), and the result establishes (5). 
It remains to verify that d is a divisor function. Remark first, that d(1) = 1: (2, 1) 
and (1, 2) both belong to A((1, 1); 3), whereas by monotonicity (x, y) e A((p, 1), 3) for 
p < 1 must satisfy x < 1. Second, d(a) > 1, if a > 2, because 1 Pa by (7). Now we 
prove d(b)/(b + 1) < d(a)/a for all a > 1 and b > 0. For suppose the contrary, 
d(b)/(b + 1)> d(a)/a for some a, b. a > 1 implies d(a) > O so d(b) > . Let 
(p", qn) be a sequence converging to (a, b + 1) with pn/qn > a/(b + 1) and (x", y") 
E A((p', qn); a + b + 1). By (5) xn > a + 1 or y" < b, so x' > a + 1 and y" < b. A 
complete means (x", y") converges to (x, y) E A((a, b + 1), a + b + 1), but x > 
a + 1 and y < b contradicts exactness. 
Therefore, there exists X > 0 such that supb>o d(b)/(b + 1) < X < infa >ld(a)/a, 
and the function d* = d/X satisfies a < d*(a) < a + 1 and defines a divisor method 
equivalent to A (and to Ad). This completes the proof that any A satisfying the axioms 
must be a divisor method for some d over all free problems. 
Using the same argument as for the real case shows that A and Ad coincide on all 
vector problems. 
The general case. Suppose, now, that A satisfies the Axioms 1' through 6' over the set 
of positive problems and let d be the divisor function such that A = Ad over the set of 
free problems. We show that A(p, a) = Ad(p, o). 
Let 8, X, It be proper for a E Ad(p, a). Then a E Ad(SXppL, h) n R(a) and, by what 
we know about free problems, a E A(SXp(l, h) n R(a). Since A is relevant, we 
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conclude a E A(8Xp.L, o), with X, > 1 implying aiN = ri- and the remaining condi- 
tions (4). But A homogeneous implies a E A(p, a), so Ad c A. 
To prove A c Ad is more involved. To begin, suppose b E A(p, a) and define 6 by 
r,= min{aiN, biN} > ri, ri+= max{aiN, bN} < ri+ and similarly for c- and c+ 
Notice that 
Xi > 1 implies aiN= ri so bi = r+ and 
X, < 1 implies aiN = ri+ so biN = r, 
and similarly for the tj. By homogeneity, b E A(\Xp,, ). But a E Ad(8Xp,i, h) n 
R(a) c A(SXp., h) n R(a) + 0 so by relevance of A, A(8XpL, o) = Ad(8Xpp, h) 
n R(a). Thus b is also a d-rounding of 8Xp!t. It remains to show that conditions (4) 
are satisfied for b. Consider the "replicated" m x 2n problem ((p, pp), 
(2r-, 2r+,c-,c-,c+,c+, 2h)). The apportionment (a,a) is an Ad-solution so also an 
A-solution of this problem. By uniformity of A, (b, a) is also an A-apportionment. But 
if ti > 1 and bMj > aMi = c-, there is i in M with bij > a,1 and (bij, a i) is not an 
Ad-solution of the corresponding two-vector problem (pij pi jt,): this ends the proof. 
11.4. Applications. The set of proportional solutions in reals, F(p, o), is the 
unique fair share matrix, whereas the set of proportional solutions in integers admits 
any divisor method solution Ad(p, a). So there are an infinite number of proportional 
methods in integers, and any particular divisor method can contain several solutions in 
case of "ties". Although the number of different divisor method apportionments to any 
one problem is small and the apportionments themselves are closely related, to be 
useful in practice the choice must somehow be limited to a particular method. But 
which one? 
The application of the methods of Adams, Webster and Jefferson can yield very 
different solutions, as witness the problem reported in Table 1. The data come from the 
French Parliamentary election of March 1986. The 577 seats of metropolitan France 
have been apportioned by the three methods on the basis of the matrix p = (p,j), 
where p,i is the number of votes obtained in department i by political party j, and a 
corresponds to asking only that each department receives a minimum of two deputies. 
The last row gives the apportionment determined by law and found as follows. Each 
department is apportioned a minimum of 2 seats found by the method of Adams on 
the basis of the populations of the departments. Then Jefferson's method is used to 
apportion the seats of each department among the parties on the basis of their 
departmental vote totals. 
Thus some criteria or operational principles that are basic to the context of the 
practical problem that is at hand must be invoked to choose a particular method. 
Adams Webster Jefferson law 
Socialist 153 201 219 216 
RPR (right) 130 162 171 162 
UDF (right) 117 112 104 129 
Communist 90 55 42 35 
National Front 
(extreme right) 87 47 41 35 
TABLE 1 
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Consider first the context of apportionment. The following summarizes ome of the 
salient results obtained in the case of vector problems [6]. Take an apportionment 
method A by which a political party with p votes gets a seats and another with q 
votes gets b seats. If these two parties form a coalition having p + q votes, whereas 
every other party's vote does not change, how many seats will the coalition receive by 
A? A encourages coalitions if it has a solution that gives at least a + b seats to the 
coalition, and it encourages schisms if it has a solution that gives at most a + b seats to 
the coalition. Jefferson's method is the unique divisor method that encourages coali- 
tions, and Adams's method is the unique divisor method that encourages schisms. In 
the context of proportional representation this characterization is a strong argument in 
favor of Jefferson's method. 
A seemingly natural consideration is this. Let [xj be the greatest integer less than or 
equal to x, and [xl the least integer greater than or equal to x. An apportionment 
method A satisfies lower fair share if it has solutions with ai > Ifi], it satisfies upper 
fair share if it has solutions with a,i [ il, and it satisfies fair share if both of the prior 
conditions are met, that is, [fi] < ai < [fil. For vector problems there exists no divisor 
method that satisfies fair share, Jefferson's is the unique divisor method that satisfies 
lower fair share, and Adams's is the unique divisor method that satisfies upper fair 
share. The underlying concept of satisfying fair share is simply not a "proportional" 
idea. The intuitive reason for this is clear: forcing a large party's or state's apportion- 
ment to satisfy fair share is in the context of proportionality a much more restrictive 
demand than forcing a small party's or state's apportionment to satisfy fair share. A 
weakened notion for vector problems can be met: A is near fair share if it has 
solutions for which no transfer of a seat from one party or state to another brings both 
apportionments nearer to their fair shares. Webster's is the unique divisor method that 
is near fair share. In the context of regional representation and "one man, one vote", 
this characterization provides a strong argument in favor of Webster's method. Added 
to this is the statistical observation that for all practical intents and purposes Webster 
apportionments (almost) always satisfy fair share. 
A method has no bias if the average of the fair shares is the same as the average of 
its apportionments over many problems. Simple inspection of several Adams and 
Jefferson apportionments convinces one that the method of Adams is significantly 
biased in favor of small states in that the average of the apportionments of a small 
state is significantly higher than the average of its fair shares whereas the opposite 
occurs for large states, and the method of Jefferson ism significantly biased in favor of 
the large states. It has been shown that for vector problems the method of Webster is 
the only unbiased method [6] over a particular sample space. Statistical analysis of 
apportionment data drawn from United States history [6] and simulations concerning 
projected 1990 and 2000 census figures [8] confirm this conclusion. In light of these 
results it is surprising that Hill's method, d(a) = /a(a + 1) currently used in the 
United States was adopted in 1941 on the (false) grounds it is unbiased! In the case of 
the constrained matrix problem we have no mathematical results. The only divisor 
method that has the possibility of being unbiased over all matrix problems-free or 
not free-is of course, Webster's, and preliminary experimental computation indicates 
that Webster's method is unbiased for equality constrainted matrix problems as well. 
Consider now the problem of reporting census data [12]. In Canada, as well as most 
countries, census data are gathered with a guarantee of anonymity [19]. Given, 
however, arrays of many tables containing cross classifications concerning a commu- 
nity that is small in numbers, it may be possible to deduce the identity of certain 
subjects, and so fail the anonymity guarantee. To foil this possibility the counts in 
Canada are recorded as multiples of 5. If one wishes the data of the tables to add 
precisely to given row and column totals and be multiples of 5, the same apportion- 
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ment problem is faced. Indeed the problem of apportionment may be said to concern 
how to round data so that all sums are precise: given the data pij, what a,i multiples 
of 5, should replace the corresponding p,i? Again the answer seems to be, proportional 
numbers. But then which divisor method should be used? In this context, the paramount 
concern is to produce proportional matrices that are "unbiased". Two alternative 
approaches commend themselves. If the sums of the rounded entries in each row (each 
column) is to be an unbiased rounding of Ejpij (of E,ipi), then Webster's method 
should be used to determine r = (r,), Ert = h (to determine c = (c;), Ecj = h) and 
then Webster's method to determine a proportional integer matrix with the correspond- 
ing equation constraints. If, however, the precise sums in rows and columns are not of 
paramount interest, then an allowable margin of error could be applied to first 
determine lower and upper constraints on rows, r- and r+, and on columns c- and c+, 
then solving the corresponding matrix problem by Webster's method. 
The results so obtained will definitely be different than those obtained by the 
approach heretofore considered [12]. It begins by calculating the quota of every piece 
of data: q' = pijh/PMN, ri' = ZEiq, c = Eiq,, where h = Ei'r/= Zcj. Then, by a 
classical result of flow theory [13], the polyhedron R' 
R' = {a: [qij < ai< [1,l rJ'] aiN < [r,'l, Lcj < aji < [CJl, aMN = h} 
contains integer solutions. The current approach chooses an a = R' that minimizes 
some measure of distance of a from the respective quotas. The difficulty here is that 
these solutions are not proportional. Even the determination [r/i' < aiN < [ri'1 results 
in a vector of row sums (a,N) that is not proportional to (PiN). This choice is 
analogous to using Hamilton's method or some method that "satisfies fair share" and 
this, we have already seen, cannot be realized by a method that is proportional. 
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